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Note
Whose Data Anyway? The Inconsistent and Prejudicial
Application of Ascertainability in Data Privacy Class
Actions
Nathan Webster*
INTRODUCTION
In September 2016, Yahoo disclosed that a data breach exposed
account information of over 500 million users in a 2014 data breach.1
Soon thereafter, on December 14, 2016, Yahoo made another disclosure: in a separate attack in 2013, malefactors gained access to the accounts of an estimated one billion users.2 The compromised information included names, telephone numbers, dates of birth, security
questions, and passwords.3 In addition to the sensitivity of the information accessed, the scope of the breach also gave cause for concern.4
At the time, less than three billion people used the Internet in the entire world.5 One breach had affected over a third of global Internet users.
Even worse, the incident was not an isolated one. In 2018, Marriot disclosed that, over the course of four years, breaches
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. The Author wishes
to thank Professor Bradley Clary, without whom this piece would not be possible. Special thanks also to the staff of the Minnesota Law Review, particularly Kaitie Eke, Melanie Griffith, and Abby Oakland. Copyright © 2021 by Nathan Webster.
1. Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/
yahoo-hack.html [https://perma.cc/CMY2-NQBY].
2. See id.
3. Id. (describing the leaked information as “sensitive”).
4. See Jim Finkle & Anya George Tharakan, Yahoo Says One Billion Accounts Exposed in Newly Discovered Security Breach, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-one-billion-accounts-exposed
-in-newly-discovered-security-breach-idUKKBN1432WZ [https://perma.cc/L78B
-DH4N] (claiming that the 2013 attack was the largest data breach in history at the
time).
5. INTERNET SOC’Y, GLOBAL INTERNET REPORT 41 (2014), https://www
.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Global_Internet_Report_2014_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C2S-KMRA].
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compromised information for 500 million guests.6 The compromised
information included passport numbers, credit card numbers, addresses, names, phone numbers, and information showing where and
when guests were traveling.7 Other victims of data breaches include:
414 million users of Adult FriendFinder, an adult dating site,8 145 million users of eBay,9 110 million customers of Target,10 83 million accounts at JP Morgan,11 57 million users of Uber,12 56 million customers
of Home Depot,13 and many others.14 Reported breaches are increasing in frequency,15 and some estimate that hackers attack the average
6. Taylor Telford & Craig Timberg, Marriot Discloses Massive Data Breach Affecting up to 500 Million Guests, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/30/marriott-discloses-massive-data
-breach-impacting-million-guests [https://perma.cc/BUT2-XECP] (“The breach of the
reservation system for Marriott’s Starwood subsidiaries was one of the largest in history, after two record-setting Yahoo hacks.”).
7. Id.
8. Andrea Peterson, Adult FriendFinder Hit with One of the Biggest Data Breaches
Ever, Report Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016, 1:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/14/adult-friendfinder-hit-with-one-of-the
-biggest-data-breaches-ever-report-says [https://perma.cc/6WEG-46FV].
9. Andrea Peterson, eBay Asks 145 Million Users To Change Passwords After Data
Breach, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
-switch/wp/2014/05/21/ebay-asks-145-million-users-to-change-passwords-after
-data-breach [https://perma.cc/39DZ-PX8W].
10. Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target
-breach-affected-70-million-customers.html [https://perma.cc/53FC-V9CJ].
11. Tanya Agrawal, David Henry & Jim Finkle, JP Morgan Hack Exposed Data of 83
Million, Among Biggest Breaches in History, REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:32 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0HR23T20141003
[https://perma.cc/J6BH-WM4Q].
12. Brian Fung, Uber Reaches $148 Million Settlement over Its 2016 Data Breach,
Which Affected 57 Million Globally, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/26/uber-reaches-million
-settlement-over-its-data-breach-which-affected-million-globally [https://perma.cc/
U546-2S3H].
13. Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger than Target’s;
‘Unique, Custom-Built Malware’ Eliminated from Retailer’s Systems After Five-Month Attack on Terminals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-1411073571 [https://perma.cc/
J6BH-WM4Q].
14. See Daniel Funke, By the Numbers: How Common Are Data Breaches – and
What Can You Do About Them?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politifact
.com/article/2019/sep/23/numbers-how-common-are-data-breaches-and-what
-can- [https://perma.cc/4GP9-RZRD] (reporting over nine thousand data breaches between 2005 and 2020).
15. Rob Sobers, 107 Must-Know Data Breach Statistics for 2020, VARONIS: INSIDE
OUT SEC. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/data-breach-statistics
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Internet-connected computer once every thirty-nine seconds.16 Perhaps most alarmingly, there are likely many thousands of attacks that
go undetected and unreported.17
Unsurprisingly, consumers are availing themselves of legal recourse. Yahoo users filed a class action suit following disclosure of the
2013 and 2014 breaches.18 Other injured consumers followed suit.19
However, as such lawsuits become more common, obstacles, both judicial and circumstantial, are emerging, threatening the ability of
plaintiffs to achieve equitable, efficient outcomes for their claims.20
This Note focuses on the issue of ascertainability, that is, the requirement that certain class actions be definable by objective criteria and
that it be administratively feasible to identify class members prior to
certification.21 As this Note will demonstrate, courts deploy this requirement inconsistently and, in doing so, perseverate on issues that
inordinately arise in data privacy class actions.22 Though courts have
traditionally scrutinized other barriers to data privacy class actions,23
ascertainability has the potential to gain prominence as traditional
barriers are surmounted.24 The limited treatment of ascertainability
in data privacy so far paints a worrying picture of inconsistent decisions, penalization of data privacy classes, and no accountability for
defendants. Unfortunately, despite the potential impact of

[https://perma.cc/9PUA-RMVD] (claiming that incidents of compromised data are “on
the rise”).
16. Hackers Attack Every 39 Seconds, NBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2007, 7:00 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17034719 [https://perma.cc/6ZE9-F4R5].
17. Thomas Claburn, Most Security Breaches Go Unreported, DARK READING (July
31, 2008, 7:27 PM), https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/most
-security-breaches-go-unreported/d/d-id/1070576 [https://perma.cc/X4LP-7SML]
(“More than 89% of security incidents went unreported in 2007 . . . .”).
18. See In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140212, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (describing the class action).
19. See, e.g., Leon Stafford, Suit Filed Against Home Depot in Possible Breach, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/business/suit-filed-against
-home-depot-possible-breach/08rQKUVc9DHTfmdsW9ox1K [https://perma.cc/
7ZQG-G4EF] (discussing a class-action lawsuit that was filed against Home Depot in a
federal court in Georgia).
20. See infra Part II (analyzing the ascertainability requirement’s threat to data
privacy class actions).
21. See infra notes 40–45, 60–62 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part II.A (discussing the inconsistent application of the ascertainability requirement and its effect on data privacy actions).
23. See infra notes 105–16 and accompanying text (discussing the standing issue
for data privacy class-actions).
24. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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ascertainability on data privacy class actions, discussion among
courts25 and legal scholars26 is scarce.
This Note will argue that the sparse case law that exists indicates
that courts are making capricious ascertainability determinations
and, in doing so, are perseverating on policy considerations that
uniquely penalize data privacy class actions for indolent recordkeeping by defendants.27 As a solution, this Note will argue that courts can
and should permit ascertainability by affidavit without exception
when a defendant’s records are overinclusive and that new legislation
awarding nominal damages would incentivize good behavior by defendants.28 Part I will examine the history of the ascertainability requirement and the subsequent circuit split.29 Next, Part I will briefly
survey the standing issue and discuss how courts’ resolution of that
barrier increases ascertainability’s potential to confound class certification.30 Part I will conclude with a brief survey of judicial and scholarly treatment of ascertainability in data privacy class actions.31 Part
II will show that the limited treatment of ascertainability among data
privacy class actions has been arbitrary thus far and employs criteria
that are particularly hostile to data privacy classes, particularly when
defendant records do not precisely identify class members.32 To conclude, Part III will suggest a two-part solution: (1) that Congress pass
legislation providing for nominal damages for data privacy infractions,33 and (2) that courts can and should permit plaintiffs to ascertain classes using affidavits when a defendant’s records are overinclusive.34 Such action would provide some predictability for parties,
promote judicial efficiency, and incentivize good behavior by defendants.

25. See infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part II.B (describing how ascertainability is particularly problematic
for data breach claims due to the imprecise nature of their damages).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Parts I.A–C.
30. See infra Part I.D.
31. See infra Part I.E.
32. See infra Parts II.A–B.
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. See infra Part III.B.
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I. BACKGROUND: ASCERTAINABILITY AS A JUDICIALLY
CONSTRUCTED, CONTENTIOUS ELEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS
A. ASCERTAINABILITY’S RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER CLASS ACTION
REQUIREMENTS
Class actions have a celebrated history in American jurisprudence.35 In a class action, many claims arising out of similar facts are
aggregated into a class represented by a representative individual or
group of individuals.36 Emerging in their modern form in the midtwentieth century, class actions seek to increase judicial efficiency and
economy.37 Plaintiffs benefit inasmuch as class actions afford the opportunity to litigate claims that would not otherwise be economically
feasible.38 Defendants, on the other hand, receive the benefit of repose—the knowledge that the suit resolves all related claims.39 Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes class actions in
four different situations, one of which ((b)(3) classes) is particularly
relevant to this Note.40
The first iteration of a class action arises where separate actions
would create a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”41 Such classes
arise where separate resolutions of similar cases might generate different instructions for similarly situated parties.42 The second type of
class arises where individual adjudication of claims “would be
35. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und
Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013) (describing class actions as “the
mechanism that has long stirred passions more than any other procedural rule”).
36. GERALD F. HESS, THERESA M. BEINER & SCOTT R. BARRIES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 397
(2015).
37. See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2018) (describing “efficiency and economy of litigation” as “a principal purpose of Rule 23”).
38. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”).
39. HESS ET AL., supra note 36.
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The rule first lays out four prerequisites for class actions.
See id. 23(a). When these prerequisites are met, the rule provides four scenarios where
class actions can be maintained. See id. 23(b).
41. Id. 23(b)(1)(A).
42. For a discussion of a (b)(1)(A) class, see Corley v. Entergy Corp., 222 F.R.D.
316, 320 (E.D. Tex. 2004), which shows how multiple plaintiffs argued that class certification under 23(b)(1)(A) was appropriate because the defendant might have been
exposed to divergent court orders and standards of conduct.
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dispositive of the interests of the other members.”43 Sometimes
known as the “limited fund” class, an archetypal example is where the
claims of many plaintiffs exceed the size of a limited fund, thereby ensuring that the only plaintiffs who will be made whole are those who
are first in time.44 The third kind of class action—the injunctive
class45—arises where the defendant “has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class” thereby making injunctive
or declaratory relief appropriate.46 An archetypal example of injunctive classes includes situations where the defendant has a policy that
discriminates against a particular group—say women or minorities—
and the plaintiffs seek a court-ordered change.47
The final (and for this Note’s purposes, most relevant) iteration
of class action arises when “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods”
of adjudicating the claims.48 Essentially used for mass-damages
claims, the purpose of this “(b)(3) class” is to allow plaintiffs to litigate
otherwise economically infeasible claims.49 Given the pecuniary interests involved, Rule 23 requires courts to give notice to (b)(3) class

43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
44. For a discussion of a “limited fund” class action, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999), which details the additional requirements plaintiffs must
satisfy to obtain this type of class certification.
45. Typically, these classes exclusively seek injunctive relief, however, some
courts have held that damages are permissible provided they are incidental to the injunctive relief sought. See, e.g., In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 416 (5th
Cir. 2004) (defining incidental as “capable of computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on the intangible, subjective differences
of each class member’s circumstances” (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998))).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
47. Kathryn A. Honecker & Kevin Hanger, Class Actions 101: Rule 23(b)(2) or
(b)(3)? Does It Matter?, A.B.A. (Sept. 11, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/committees/class-actions/articles/2011/summer2011-class
-actions-101-federal-rules-civil-procedure [https://perma.cc/BV4P-Q4P6] (explaining that the purpose of such a class action is usually to obtain injunctive relief that will
force the defendant to alter the discriminatory policy).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
49. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy . . . of
the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997))).
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members, including (if practicable) individual notice mailed to potential plaintiffs.50
However, before plaintiffs can avail themselves of Rule 23, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identify four preliminary requirements plaintiffs must satisfy as a prerequisite for class certification:
(1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.51
Additionally, courts have subsequently imposed a fifth requirement,
namely that the putative class be ascertainable by “objective criteria,”
characterized by many circuits as “ascertainability.”52 This general objective criteria requirement—also known as “weak” ascertainability53—is typically a low bar, only requiring that classes be clearly defined enough such that individuals can determine they are members54
and not be defined by reference to subjective criteria such as state of
mind55 or in terms of success on the merits of a claim.56 Though not
every circuit articulates this requirement as a distinct precondition to
certification,57 all circuits require that members of prospective classes
be identifiable by objective criteria.58
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to class members the best
notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”).
51. See id. 23(a)(1)–(4).
52. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that this requirement has been imposed on all class actions regardless of
which subsection of Rule 23 they fell under).
53. See Tom Murphy, Comment, Implied Class Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit Ascertainability Requirement in the Wake of Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 57 B.C. L. REV. E.
SUPP. 34, 50 (2016).
54. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659–60.
55. Id. at 659.
56. Id. at 657 (discussing “fail-safe” classes).
57. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996
(8th Cir. 2016) (clarifying that, though a class must be ascertainable through objective
criteria, this is an implicit requirement of the existing class action rules and does not
constitute a separate prerequisite); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657 (noting that “courts have
sometimes used the term ‘ascertainability’” to describe the requirement that (b)(3)
classes be definable by objective criteria (emphasis added)).
58. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining
that the definitions of classes must be definite and citing cases); In re Petrobras Sec.,
862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that “a class is ascertainable if it is defined
using objective criteria”); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the argument that defining a class involves an objective evaluation); EQT Prod.
Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that “a class cannot be certified
unless a court can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria”); Seeligson v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 761 F. App’x 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that a class must be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable” (quoting Union
Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2012))); Young v.
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Though courts are not in universal agreement, many circuits
characterize ascertainability as only requiring that classes be definable by “objective criteria” to (b)(3) damages classes, if they articulate
a distinct ascertainability requirement at all.59 Courts justify this limitation by pointing to the notice requirement imposed on (b)(3) classes.60 Inasmuch as (b)(2) classes need not give notice to their members,61 multiple circuits hold that “the actual membership of the class
need not . . . be precisely delimited.”62 In this spirit, the Third,63 Fifth,64
and Tenth Circuits65 have explicitly rejected ascertainability as a requirement for (b)(2) injunctive classes.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 693 F.3d 532, 538–39 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 23.21[3] (3d ed. 1997)); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657 (holding that “a class must
be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria”); Sandusky
Wellness Ctr., 821 F.3d at 997–98 (quoting Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d
Cir. 2015)); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1124 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explicitly rejecting a discrete “ascertainability” requirement but recognizing the need
for classes to be defined based on objective criteria); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116,
1146 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring that a class definition be sufficiently definite so as to
indicate who is a member (citing Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 144 (D. Colo. 1995)));
Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (“This court has
stated that a class is not ascertainable unless the class definition contains objective
criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an administratively feasible
way.” (citing Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782, 787 (11th
Cir. 2014))).
59. See, e.g., Moore v. Walter Coke, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 620, 627 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“Ascertainability depends on the class definition, and a successful definition is one that is
‘precise, objective, and presently ascertainable . . . by reference to objective criteria.’”
(quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004))).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Byrd, 784 F.3d at 165 (noting that “[t]he separate ascertainability requirement ensures that class members can be identified after
certification . . . and therefore better prepares a district court to direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances” (citation omitted) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B))); Moore, 294 F.R.D. at 627 (“For a 23(b)(3) class, ascertainability is also important because the ‘best notice practicable’ must be given to all
class members, which often requires a list of addresses.” (citing Krueger v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 03-CV-2496, 2011 WL 8984448, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2011))).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (choosing not to discuss a notice requirement).
62. E.g., Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Yaffe
v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972)).
63. Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The nature of Rule
23(b)(2) actions . . . lead[s] us to conclude that ascertainability is not a requirement for
certification of a(b)(2) [sic] class seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief.”).
64. See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that precise class definition is not a requirement when plaintiffs plead a (b)(2) class
and opt-out rights are not requested).
65. See Shook, 386 F.3d at 972. However, such a ruling was not strictly necessary
inasmuch as the Tenth Circuit has thus far declined to rule conclusively on ascertainability, only mentioning the requirement in one case. See Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral
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B. CARRERA AND THE HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
However, despite the courts’ uniformity in requiring a general
notion of ascertainability—namely objective criteria—for (b)(3) damages classes, the circuits split in their characterization of what exactly
“identifiable with respect to objective criteria” ought to entail.66 The
Third Circuit precipitated this split in its 2013 case, Carrera v. Bayer
Corp.67 In Carrera, plaintiffs attempted to certify a (b)(3) class against
defendant Bayer Corporation for “falsely and deceptively” advertising
a product as having metabolism-enhancing effects.68 The essence of
the plaintiffs’ complaint was that the product did not, in fact, enhance
metabolism.69 In moving to certify the class, plaintiffs attempted to establish ascertainability in two ways: (1) through online retailer records and sales made with store loyalty or reward cards, and (2)
through class members’ provision of affidavits attesting that they
bought the product and detailing the amount purchased.70 The district
court ordered certification over the defendant’s objections, defining
the class as every person who purchased the product in Florida.71
On appeal, the circuit court revisited the issue of ascertainability.72 The court identified three particularly important justifications
for requiring ascertainability in a (b)(3) damages class, namely: (1) to
provide plaintiff class members the opportunity to opt out, (2) to ensure a defendant’s rights are protected by the class action mechanism,
and (3) to ensure class members are identified consistently with “the
efficiencies of a class action.”73 For a class to be ascertainable (and further the aforementioned objectives) the court clarified that class
members must be identifiable “without extensive and individualized
fact-finding or ‘mini-trials.’”74 The court held that, rather than merely
Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779, 788 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that defendant’s attempt
to plead ascertainability failed on procedural grounds).
66. See infra Part I.C (providing an analysis of the circuit split).
67. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
68. Id. at 304.
69. Id. (explaining how the plaintiffs alleged that Bayer falsely asserted that its
product enhanced metabolism due to its inclusion of a green tea extract).
70. Id.
71. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-4716, 2011 WL 5878376, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 22,
2011) (concluding that the plaintiffs had satisfied all of Rule 23’s certification requirements).
72. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 303.
73. Id. at 307 (“The sole issue on appeal is whether the class members are ascertainable.”).
74. Id. at 304 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir.
2012)).
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identifying “objective criteria,” class members must be identifiable in
a way that is “administratively feasible,” which the court took to mean
a “manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual
factual inquiry,”75 and that identification must take place “at the class
certification stage.”76 Thus was born the “heightened” ascertainability
requirements, which has split courts and scholars alike.77
Using this new, heightened standard requiring an administratively feasible mechanism of class identification rather than mere objective criteria, the court proceeded to de-certify the plaintiffs’ class.78
The court found that, because the online records and rewards cards
records could not identify individual purchasers of the product, the
proposed methods of ascertaining the class were not administratively
feasible inasmuch as they would require extensive individual factual
inquiries.79 The court’s denial of certification threw down a gauntlet:
not only would prospective classes have to satisfy the “objective criteria standard” (also known as “weak” ascertainability,) classes would
also have to demonstrate an “administratively feasible” method of
identifying members before certification, a standard that some classes
might never clear where defendant records were deficient.80
C. THE ASCERTAINABILITY CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Following the decision in Carrera, the courts of appeals diverged
with some accepting and some rejecting the new administrative feasibility requirement.81 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited Carrera in holding that, to establish ascertainability, plaintiffs must
demonstrate “an administratively feasible method by which class
members can be identified.”82 Similar to the Carrera court, the Eleventh Circuit precluded self-identification and perfunctory references

75. Id. at 307 (first quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594; and then quoting WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)).
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 82–90 (identifying the ascertainability circuit split).
78. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 312 (remanding the case to give the plaintiffs another
opportunity to satisfy the ascertainability requirement).
79. Id. at 308–09.
80. See generally infra Part I.D (explaining how data privacy class actions are in a
position where they are particularly vulnerable to dismissal for lack of ascertainability).
81. See infra notes 82–90.
82. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2015).
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to defendant records as establishing ascertainability.83 Indeed, the
Court quoted Carrera in precluding a finding of ascertainability absent
plaintiffs’ proposing a method with “evidentiary support that the
method would be successful.”84 Similarly, in In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation, the First Circuit quoted Carrera in holding that “[a]t the class
certification stage, the court must be satisfied that, prior to judgment,
it will be possible to establish a mechanism for distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class members” and that the mechanism
must be “administratively feasible.”85
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected Carrera’s holding, saying that the Third Circuit’s reasoning “goes much further than
the established meaning of ascertainability and in our view misreads
Rule 23” and instead held that more detailed questions about ascertainability could be delayed until later in litigation.86 The Sixth Circuit
followed the Seventh Circuit’s example.87 When a defendant objected
to class certification on the grounds of administrative feasibility, the
court rejected the argument saying it saw “no reason to follow Carrera, particularly given the strong criticism it has attracted from other
courts.”88 The Second Circuit joined the others, holding that “a freestanding administrative feasibility requirement is neither compelled
by precedent nor consistent with Rule 23.”89 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
concurred, saying that “an independent administrative feasibility requirement is unnecessary” and that the policy objectives outlined in
Carrera are sufficiently addressed in Rule 23.90 The emerging circuit

83. Id. at 947 (“[T]he plaintiff must also establish that the records are in fact useful for identification purposes, and that identification will be administratively feasible.”
(citing Stalley v. ADS All. Data Sys., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 670, 679–80 (M.D. Fla. 2013))).
84. Id. at 948 (citing Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306–07).
85. 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307).
86. Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).
87. Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015).
88. Id.
89. In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 264 (2d Cir. 2017).
90. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2017).
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split notwithstanding, the Fourth,91 Fifth,92 Eighth,93 and Tenth94 Circuits have not yet weighed in on the heightened ascertainability requirement.
Further, the ascertainability controversy shows continued vitality. The Supreme Court has declined certiorari on at least three separate occasions.95 As such, the uncertainty around ascertainability is
likely to continue at least for the present. Indeed, rather than atrophying, the dispute over ascertainability is trickling down from federal
courts into state courts as well.96 Thus, even if the Supreme Court does
resolve the issue, the controversy will likely live on in state jurisprudence.
The heightened ascertainability requirement (and its attendant
circuit split) raises the following critical question: if plaintiffs pleading
a (b)(3) class are required to demonstrate an “administratively feasible” method of establishing class membership, what approach should
plaintiffs take when defendants’ records are insufficient to precisely
demarcate the class?97 One popular solution is the submission of affidavits, where plaintiffs fill out a form certifying they are class
91. See Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 655 (4th Cir. 2019) (employing the “objective criteria” standard for establishing ascertainability).
92. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 821 (5th Cir. 2014) (claiming that
class certification is not precluded simply because some members would be unable to
succeed on their individual claims).
93. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir.
2016) (explicitly declining to take a position on the ascertainability split).
94. Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779, 788 n.9 (10th Cir.
2019) (noting, in the circuit’s only mention of ascertainability, that the plaintiff’s pleadings were procedurally deficient).
95. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1127, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Rikos v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016);
Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161–
62 (2016).
96. See, e.g., Stephen Carr, Appeals Court Re-inflates Kiddie Pool Class Action, A.B.A.
(July 1, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/
litigation-news/top-stories/2020/appeals-court-re-inflates-kiddie-pool-action
[https://perma.cc/B2RP-K2SS] (explaining the importance of a recent decision from
the California Supreme Court).
97. Given the abundance of electronic data in modern life, it might surprise readers to learn that defendant records are not guaranteed to precisely identify which consumers or service subscribers are affected by any given issue. Id. (detailing defendant
record deficiencies in the context of a consumer class); see also infra Part II.A (detailing
cases with deficient defendant records specifically in the data privacy context); Juliana
de Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGIT. GUARDIAN: DATA INSIDER (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/M4G4
-DX9A] (detailing a 2012 data breach at Experian where the total number of compromised records is, as of this writing, “unknown”).
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members.98 The Third Circuit—having the most developed ascertainability caselaw—has spoken favorably of the use of affidavits in establishing ascertainability where defendant records are deficient.99 Indeed, the circuit has entertained the idea of permitting supplemental
evidence as a way to buttress the credibility of such affidavits.100 However, such flexibility notwithstanding, the circuit gives trial judges
broad discretion in determining the circumstances under which affidavits are acceptable to fulfill ascertainability.101 Such autonomy has
resulted in inconsistent application, as this Note later discusses.102
D. THE RECEDING STANDING ISSUE AND OTHER JURISPRUDENCE INCREASES
THE THREAT POSED BY ASCERTAINABILITY
The ongoing judicial dispute over the requirements of ascertainability has potentially profound implications for data privacy class actions.103 As courts and other parties begin to devise ways around traditional barriers to data breach class actions, ascertainability will
potentially become a powerful inhibitor to class certification.104
Traditionally, data privacy class actions faltered on issues of
standing rather than ascertainability.105 For the last decade, challenges to data privacy and data breach class actions focused on plaintiffs’ abilities to articulate theories of injury in fact that were
98. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., id. (holding that “[w]here a defendant’s lack of records . . . make it
more difficult to ascertain the members of an otherwise objectively verifiable lowvalue class, the consumers who make up that class should not be made to suffer” (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014)
(Ambro, J., dissenting))).
100. See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434,
441 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Affidavits, in combination with records or other reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the ascertainability standard.” (quoting Byrd,
784 F.3d at 170–71)).
101. See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 173–74 (making clear that “[i]t is the trial judge’s province to determine what proof may be required at the claims submission and claims
administration stage” and “when approving a claim form”).
102. Infra Part II.A.
103. See infra Parts II.A–B.
104. See supra Part I.D.
105. See Aaron Benjamin Edelman, Note, Increasing Lapses in Data Security: The
Need for a Common Answer to What Constitutes Standing in a Data Breach Context, 28
J.L. & POL’Y 150, 161–64 (2019) (discussing the historical reluctance of some courts to
recognize standing in data privacy class actions); see also In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y
Litig., No. C-12-01382, 2013 WL 6248499, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“And so even
though injury-in-fact [a component of standing] may not generally be Mount Everest,
as then-Judge Alito observed, in data privacy cases . . . the doctrine might still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.” (footnote omitted)).
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persuasive enough for courts to find standing under Article III of the
Constitution.106 Article III extends the power of the federal judiciary
to cases and controversies.107 Courts have held that, to demonstrate
standing under Article III, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that they
have suffered a concrete injury (an injury in fact), (2) that the injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and (3) that it is likely,
and not speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the injury.108 Academics identify the injury in fact requirement as posing the
most difficulty for data breach classes.109 Specifically, the disclosure of
private information often comes (a) without pecuniary consequence,
or (b) without evidence of misuse of data, leaving some courts unwilling to find an injury in fact.110
However, despite initial judicial obstacles, data privacy plaintiffs
have begun devising successful legal strategies for overcoming the
standing requirement. For instance, some circuits have recognized increased likelihood of injury as a sufficient basis for finding standing in
the context of data privacy class actions.111 One case has even succeeded on the argument that dissemination of private information decreases its inherent value, thereby causing injury sufficient to establish standing.112 Still more plaintiffs have successfully argued that
failure to adequately protect data constitutes a misrepresentation that
106. Eric S. Boos, Chandler Givens & Nick Larry, Damages Theories in Data Breach
Litigation, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 126 (2015) (noting that “[f]or the most part these
cases have failed to progress past the motion to dismiss stage, as defendants have successfully challenged the ability of litigants to demonstrate cognizable injuries sufficient
to confer Article III standing”).
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
108. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
109. See, e.g., Clara Kim, Granting Standing in Data Breach Cases: The Seventh Circuit Paves the Way Towards a Solution to the Increasingly Pervasive Data Breach Problem, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 544, 557. See generally Megan Dowty, Life Is Short: Go to
Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683
(2017).
110. See, e.g., In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 527 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (finding that credit card reimbursements precluded a finding of injury in fact);
Chambliss v. CareFirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 572–73 (D. Md. 2016) (finding that,
despite defendant’s loss of insurance data, plaintiffs’ inability to prove misuse of lost
data precluded finding of injury in fact).
111. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding that the exposure of names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of defendant employees increased threat of future identity theft sufficient to establish standing
under Article III); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding that “an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future
harm” is sufficient to establish standing provided the other Lujan factors are met).
112. See Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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deprives class members of a benefit of the bargain.113 Also, more arguments are developing that, while not yet successful, indicate continued efforts to obviate the standing barrier to class actions.114 The Supreme Court’s placing additional scrutiny on the standing
requirement115 notwithstanding, appellate courts are still successfully
finding standing in data breach class actions.116 Furthermore, even as
courts continue to find ways around the standing hurdle, nonjudicial
entities such as law reviews are engaged in a careful evaluation of the
standing issue, further expounding potential solutions to an already
diminished barrier.117 As such, defendants are likely to increasingly
employ other arguments when attempting to kill data privacy class actions.
Further, ongoing legal challenges for data privacy class certification continue to limit common-law avenues of securing relief, thereby
heightening reliance on statutory avenues of relief. For instance, in
many common-law causes of action like negligence, plaintiffs must
also establish causation and damages if they are to survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.118 In the data privacy context, several courts have
proved unwilling to accept plaintiffs’ articulation of causation and
damages.119 The limitations of traditional causes of action in
113. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Priv. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093–94 (N.D.
Cal. 2013); Svenson v. Google, Inc., No. 13-CV-04080, 2015 WL 1503429, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 1, 2015).
114. See, e.g., Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (dismissing claim where plaintiff
sought to establish standing by arguing damages from expenses incurred in mitigating
the disclosure of their personal data).
115. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (emphasizing the particular elements of the standing requirement).
116. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–
41 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that Spokeo merely reiterated traditional standing doctrine
and finding that plaintiffs whose data had been leaked in contravention of a federal
statute had pleaded standing with sufficient concreteness).
117. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1323, 1365 (2017) (suggesting the Court take a broader view of standing in data
breach cases); Cristiana Modesti, Incentivizing Cybersecurity Compliance in the New
Digital Age: Prevalence of Security Breaches Should Prompt Action by Congress and the
Supreme Court, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 216 (2018) (suggesting the Court define Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard to national security risks). See generally
Kim, supra note 109.
118. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Suzuki Motor Co., 776 F. Supp. 698, 700–01 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
119. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding that plaintiffs’ data privacy action failed to plead actual damage sufficient to
establish negligence and failed to plead a sufficient meeting of the minds to establish
an implied contract); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
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adequately sustaining data privacy suits ensure that statutory relief
will continue to play an important role.120 Indeed, in cases where
courts dismissed common law claims, they have been known to allow
statutory claims to stand.121 Given its capricious application and
courts’ propensity to penalize statutory damages where a defendant’s
records are not exhaustive, ascertainability is ripe for exploitation.122
E. JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY TREATMENT OF ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS
A survey of the case law reveals few cases, at present, where ascertainability has been an issue in data privacy suits. The litigation
that has happened took place at the district level. In Opperman v. Kong
Technologies Inc., a plaintiff class sued Apple and application developers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for allegedly permitting applications to upload class members’ address book information without their knowledge or consent.123 In light of the fact that
it was unclear exactly which users of the address book application
were affected, the court noted that “variations among the App Defendants in available information regarding users who had their address
book data uploaded by a charged app could create ascertainability issues on class certification.”124 However, in the same case on a subsequent ruling on class certification, the same court dismissed any ascertainability concerns.125 Citing Briseno, the court clarified that, in
the Ninth Circuit, such obstacles were properly addressed in a 23(a)
analysis.126
Similarly, the court mentioned ascertainability in dicta in In re Yahoo Mail Litigation.127 There, the court in the Northern District of California, in an order partially granting certification, held that in the case
996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing negligence theories in a data privacy
suit for failing to establish causation and actual damage).
120. See, e.g., In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (pleading
relief under the Stored Communications Act and California’s Invasion of Privacy Act);
In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y Litig., No. C-12-01382, 2013 WL 6248499, at *10, *16 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (dismissing common-law causes of action but countenancing statutory causes of action).
121. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54.
122. See infra Part III.
123. Opperman v. Kong Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-00453, 2017 WL 3149205 (N.D. Cal.
July 6, 2017).
124. Id. at *15–16.
125. Opperman v. Kong Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-00453, 2017 WL 3149205, at *5
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017).
126. Id.
127. In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 596 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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of a 23(b)(2) class for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs did not need to
define the class in an ascertainable way inasmuch as ascertainability
is not necessary for the issuance of injunctive relief.128 Similar to Yahoo, in In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, the defendants objected to the plaintiffs’ method of ascertaining the class (via affidavit),
but the court denied certification for lack of predominance and did not
address the ascertainability issue.129 Again, in In re Lenovo Adware Litigation the court reiterated a heightened ascertainability requirement
but did not analyze the issue inasmuch as the defendants had not objected to the plaintiff’s assertion that the class was ascertainable with
reference to defendant’s records.130
In two other cases, which will be the subject of further discussion
in Part II, ascertainability played a more important role. In Harris v.
comScore, Inc., plaintiffs in the Northern District of Illinois argued that
all but a few class members could be established by referencing the
plaintiff’s records and that the rest could submit affidavits.131 The
court found that the small proportion of class members missing from
the defendant’s records made affidavits manageable and found ascertainability satisfied.132 Conversely, in In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, the
court denied certification due to an unascertainable class.133 In doing
so, the court found that despite the fact that the entirety of the class
was encompassed by defendant’s records, the fact that the records
were overinclusive necessitated submission of affidavits by the larger
part of the class, therefore rendering ascertainability by affidavit unmanageable.134
Even more sparse than the judicial treatment of ascertainability
in the data breach context is its treatment in the secondary literature.
As of this writing, only one scholarly work appears to specifically address ascertainability in the context of data privacy breaches. Without
citing to any caselaw or statute, J. Thomas Ritchie reviewed the aforementioned circuit split regarding ascertainability.135 He continued to
hypothesize that cases like Carrera and EQT Production Co. v. Adair,
128. Id.
129. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).
130. In re Lenovo Adware Litig., No. 15-MD-02624, 2016 WL 6277245, at *16–17
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016).
131. 292 F.R.D. 579, 587 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
132. Id. at 587–88.
133. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 2758598, at *13–15 (N.D. Cal.
June 16, 2014).
134. Id. at *16.
135. J. Thomas Richie, Data Breach Class Actions, 44 BRIEF 12, 16 (2015).
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with their heightened ascertainability requirement, might “make certification less likely” though he cited no statutory or judicial authority.136 Given the sparse judicial consideration of ascertainability in the
data privacy context, the subject is ripe for review.
II. ASCERTAINABILITY IN DATA PRIVACY CLASS ACTIONS LEADS
TO ARBITRARY CERTIFICATION DECISIONS, FOCUSES ON FACTORS
PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING TO DATA PRIVACY SUITS, AND
FAILS TO INCENTIVIZE GOOD BEHAVIOR
This Part will identify how the strict ascertainability requirement
is applied inconsistently from case to case in the data privacy context,
noting that similar situations receive different outcomes based on
judges’ individual estimations of what is “manageable.” Then, it will
focus on how, when defendants’ records are not sufficient to identify
every class member at the outset, courts use large statutory damages
(a hallmark of laws commonly used to bring data privacy suits) as an
excuse to preclude the use of affidavits to establish ascertainability.
Finally, this Part analyzes how courts’ inconsistent, prejudicial application of ascertainability creates different outcomes for similarly situated plaintiffs and undermines the goal of class actions to adjudicate
claims efficiently.
A. COURTS ENFORCE ASCERTAINABILITY RULES INCONSISTENTLY FROM CASE
TO CASE
The ascertainability requirement, while never universally accepted, suffers from a lack of consistent application.137 Data privacy
class actions, with their vast scope and technical sophistication, are
particularly vulnerable to arbitrary judicial determinations of ascertainability and “manageability” that lead to conflicting, unpredictable
results for different suits. The two cases that particularly encapsulate
this issue are Harris v. comScore, Inc.138 and In re Hulu Privacy Litigation,139 the implications of which become clear in additional data privacy cases such as In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation140 and Backhaut v.
Apple Inc.141

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 17.
Supra notes 89–105 and accompanying text.
292 F.R.D. 579, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
No. C 11-03764, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83661, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014).
No. 13-MD-02430, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).
No. 14-CV-02285, 2015 WL 4776427 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015).
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In Harris v. comScore Inc., plaintiffs asserted a classic data scraping claim, that is, that comScore illegally obtained information from
class members’ computers, repackaged it, and sold it to purveyors of
targeted advertising.142 Defendant comScore garnered its data
through a program called OSSProxy.143 When users installed
OSSProxy on their computers, the program collected data, sending it
to comScore’s servers.144 comScore induced consumers to download
OSSProxy by partnering with bundlers, who provided free digital
products to Internet users who downloaded the bundle.145 In downloading the bundlers’ software, consumers confronted a message informing them that the comScore OSSProxy software was included
“[i]n order to provide this free download.”146 Alleging several theories
of damages, the plaintiffs sued under the Stored Communications Act,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, and the common-law theory of unjust enrichment.147
In arguing for certification, the plaintiffs countered comScore’s
assertion that the task of identifying class members would “swamp[]
any common questions in this case.”148 Plaintiffs argued that, rather
than class members needing to be ascertained, the class must merely
be ascertainable (defined by objective criteria).149 Here, plaintiffs argued that the objective criteria were clear: namely, whether the class
members downloaded the software.150 If there were no corroborating
records to prove class members’ downloading of the software, plaintiffs argued that submission of an affidavit affirming that members
had downloaded the software would suffice.151
At the time of the comScore case, the Northern District of Illinois
accepted the Third Circuit’s ascertainability requirement that class
members be identifiable with reference to objective criteria and that
there be an administratively feasible way of determining membership
at certification.152 Both parties agreed that comScore’s records would
142. 292 F.R.D. at 581.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 582.
147. Id. at 581.
148. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Their Supplemental Motion for Class Certification at 9, Harris v. comScore Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (No. 11 C 5807).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 15.
151. Id. at 10.
152. Harris, 292 F.R.D. at 587 (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
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identify at least some proportion of the proposed class.153 comScore,
however, noted that permitting submission of affidavits would be unwieldy and entail individualized fact determinations inasmuch as
comScore would be entitled to challenge each affidavit.154 The court,
while recognizing that affidavits could violate the ascertainability requirement, also noted that courts have permitted class identification
by affidavit where the administrative burden was “minimal.”155 The
court ultimately found that the proposed class was ascertainable inasmuch as most class members were identifiable through comScore’s
records, rendering the use of affidavits “manageable.”156
However, in another case, the court in the Northern District of
California treated affidavits completely differently despite similar
facts. In In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Hulu, a
video streaming website, had inappropriately taken data from users
and distributed it to Facebook and other purveyors of targeted ads.157
As with comScore, the court required that class members be identifiable with reference to objective criteria such that it was “administratively feasible” for the court to determine who was bound by the judgment.158 Citing comScore, the plaintiffs argued in their reply in favor
of certification that class members, though not ascertainable through
Hulu’s records, could self-identify through affidavits.159 Since both Facebook and Hulu require users to register using email addresses,
cross-referencing the records of both Hulu and Facebook would (theoretically) produce a list including all of the class members who had
data stolen.160 However, the court noted that cross-referencing would
not satisfy ascertainability inasmuch as the true class members were
those who had their personal data actually transmitted to Facebook,
which depended on a number of factors.161 Given that cross-referencing would produce an over-inclusive class, the court concluded that
153. Id.
154. Id. at 587–88.
155. Id. at 587 (citing Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408,
417 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).
156. Id. at 588.
157. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 2758598, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
June 16, 2014) (pleading a subclass for those whose data was harvested by comScore
and a subclass for those whose data was harvested by Facebook).
158. Id. at *13 (citing Shepard v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. C 12-3893, 2013 WL
4488802 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013)).
159. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 26 n.15, In re
Hulu Priv. Litig, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (2015) (No. 11-CV-03764).
160. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., 2014 WL 2758598, at *14.
161. Id.
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the only way to actually ascertain who was in the class (rather than
define the class) was through submission of affidavits.162
Having theretofore mirrored the reasoning in comScore, the Hulu
court abruptly diverged. Citing comScore, the court held that, while affidavits were sometimes an acceptable method of satisfying ascertainability, it can also be improper to satisfy ascertainability “only by assertion of the class-members.”163 The Hulu court, citing a treatise,164
instead decided to weigh the ease of documentation, the difficulty of
verifying the claims, and the size of the claims.165 The court found,
with little explanation, that the claims were hard to verify, that documentation would be burdensome, and that the claims were large.166
Though the claims in the comScore case were also difficult to verify
and also pleaded large claims, the Hulu court nevertheless found that
ascertainability was not satisfied.167 In doing so, it distinguished its
decision from comScore, noting that in comScore, “the ‘bulk’ of the
class membership would be determined by comScore’s own records”
whereas with the instant case “records here would identify a large
pool of users with only a subset . . . suffering any injury.”168 The court
essentially decided that ascertainability was not satisfied because a
larger proportion of Hulu class members required verification than
the comScore class members. Though some might argue that courts
have every right to make determinations based on the proportion of
the class that has to submit affidavits, such discretion nevertheless
raises an important concern of judicial arbitrariness, particularly
where—as was the case in Hulu—the court makes no attempt to set
forth a rule or guiding principal on which future plaintiffs can rely.169
In the end, both classes contemplated ascertainability by affidavit. The
Hulu decision, though ostensibly resting on a distinction in degree, in
reality rests on an expectation of unquestioned deference to judicial
determinations of what constitutes too many affidavits. Both plaintiffs
and defendants should expect, and deserve, more reliable indicia, particularly in the case of data privacy where potential classes are vast
and judgments of proportion have outsized effects.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 587–88 (N.D. Ill. 2013)).
164. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10.12 (Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg eds., 4th
ed. 2012).
165. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., 2014 WL 2758598, at *13–15 (citing NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS, supra note 164).
166. Id. at *14–15.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See generally id.
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Such necessity of affidavits to complement defendant records in
data privacy class actions extends to other cases as well. For instance,
in a consolidated class action against Google, plaintiffs alleged that
Google illegally intercepted (scraped) messages sent through
Gmail.170 The class included users of Gmail, as well as users of other
email providers who had exchanged emails with Gmail account owners.171 Though the case was dismissed for failure to satisfy the predominance requirement of class actions,172 the pleadings in the case
fiercely contested ascertainability.173 Plaintiffs asserted that the subclasses with Gmail accounts were “easily ascertainable because they
have Gmail accounts and contracts with Google” and that the subclass
of non-Gmail users could be ascertainable through the submission of
an email, essentially an affidavit.174 Google, in its motion to dismiss,
argued that despite plaintiffs’ assertion that the class was easily ascertainable from defendant’s records, the plaintiffs had not explained
“what documents they were referring to and did not cite any supporting evidence” proving the assertion to be true.175 Had the case not
been decided on predominance grounds, and Google’s assertions
proved correct, plaintiffs might very well have had to take their
chances with the submission of affidavits. Given the juxtaposition of
Hulu and comScore, the outcome would have been far from certain.
Similarly, in Backhaut v. Apple Inc., plaintiffs sued Apple, saying
that the company had improperly intercepted messages sent through
the Apple iPhone iOS operating system, causing them not to reach
their intended recipients.176 The Northern District of California articulated the same ascertainability standard as in other cases, namely
that it be defined by objective criteria and that it is administratively
170. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).
171. Id.
172. Id. at *81–83.
173. See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Motion for Class Certification at 20–24, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (No. 13MD-02430); Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual & Class Action Complaint; Memorandum of Point & Authorities in Support
Thereof at 50–52, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (No. 13MD-02430).
174. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Motion for Class Certification, supra note 173, at 20.
175. Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual
& Class Action Complaint; Memorandum of Point & Authorities in Support Thereof, supra note 173.
176. Backhaut v. Apple Inc., No. 14-CV-02285, 2015 WL 4776427, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2015).
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feasible to determine whether potential members belong to a class.177
Unsurprisingly, defendants, in opposition to class certification, argued
that the only way to ascertain whether a person is in the class is
through self-identification through affidavit, a process defendants argued would be unreliable and unfeasible.178 The court agreed, saying
that self-reporting would require each plaintiff class member to determine whether they had failed to receive a message.179 Permitting
this method of class identification required, in the court’s view “individualized factual determinations,” thereby precluding class certification on ascertainability grounds.180
Indeed, the only way to mitigate the threat of ascertainability in
the data privacy context might be to avoid pleading damages, or to
hope that the defendants lack the wherewithal to plead ascertainability. In In re Yahoo Mail Litigation, plaintiffs sued Yahoo for scanning
information in ingoing and outgoing messages pertaining to Yahoo
email accounts.181 Though Yahoo obtained consent for the data extraction from those with Yahoo accounts, it made no other effort to obtain
consent to scrape data from the messages of non-Yahoo users.182 Unlike other cases, the plaintiffs only requested injunctive relief.183
Though the defendants attempted to argue that (b)(2) injunctive relief
classes also had to demonstrate administrative feasibility,184 the court
decided that the ascertainability requirement only applied to (b)(3)
damages classes.185 In Lenovo as previously iterated, the court declined to analyze ascertainability given that the defendants had not
objected to the plaintiffs’ prospective use of affidavits.186
Simply put, the interplay of Hulu and comScore established a troubling precedent: where defendant records do not precisely establish
the contours of a (b)(3) damages class, courts are at liberty to make
arbitrary determinations about the acceptable proportion of a class
177. Id. at *9–10 (citing Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., No. 09-1314, 2012 WL 993531,
at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012)).
178. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 10–12,
Backhaut, 2015 WL 4776427 (No. 14-CV-02285).
179. Backhaut, 2015 WL 477427, at *12.
180. Id. at *11.
181. In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 583 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
182. Id. at 584.
183. Id. at 585.
184. Id. at 596.
185. Id. at 597 (holding that the nature of relief sought for a (b)(2) class meant
there was little purpose to an ascertainability requirement).
186. In re Lenovo Adware Litig., No. 15-MD-02624, 2016 WL 6277245, at *15 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2016).
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that can satisfy ascertainability through affidavits.187 Such precedent
gives judicial ammunition to data privacy defendants’ established efforts to defeat class certification by invoking ascertainability.188
B. THE HULU COURT’S RELIANCE ON CLAIM SIZE IS UNIQUELY CHALLENGING
FOR DATA PRIVACY PLAINTIFFS
In addition to being arbitrarily applied and disincentivizing damages classes, courts evaluate ascertainability in a way that is uniquely
challenging for data privacy class actions. Citing Newberg on Class Actions, the Harris court stated that ascertainability by affidavit can be
appropriate “where claims are small or are not amenable to ready verification.”189 The Hulu court adopted this reasoning, citing Harris’s reliance on Newberg in finding that a statutory penalty of $2,500 was
“not small” and therefore militated against the use of affidavits.190
Such focus on damages is particularly challenging in the data privacy
context. Damages in data breach lawsuits are notoriously imprecise.191 Pleading actual damage from the loss of data often results in
dismissal or pitifully small awards.192
As such, statutory damages are often the only method by which
plaintiffs pleading federal claims can receive meaningful damages,
particularly if state legislatures have not provided methods of relief.
In what initially seems to be a windfall for plaintiffs, statutory damages can be quite generous. For instance, the Stored Communications
Act, cited by the Harris and Yahoo courts, permits minimum statutory

187. Supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
188. Supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
189. Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 588 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting ALBA
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:12 (4th ed. rev. 2012)).
190. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 2758598, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal.
June 16, 2014) (citing Harris, 292 F.R.D. at 587–88).
191. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639
(3d Cir. 2017) (asserting that “[d]amages for a violation of an individual’s privacy are
a quintessential example of damages that are uncertain and possibly unmeasurable”
(citation omitted)); Patrick J. Lorio, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III
Standing, and a Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 87–88
(2017) (discussing difficulties data privacy litigants face in attempting to establish actual damages).
192. See generally In re Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 639; In re Rutter’s Data Sec.
Breach Litig., No. 20-CV-382, 2021 WL 29054, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2021) (dismissing
data privacy litigants where plaintiffs had “only possible future injuries and prophylactic measures to avoid those potential injuries”); In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 15CV-222, 2016 WL 4732630, at *15–17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016) (finding that patients
whose health data was stolen suffered no actual damages).
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damages of $1,000 per claim.193 The Communications Privacy Act,
cited by the Harris and Gmail courts, awards up to $500 per claim for
initial offenders, and up to $1,000 for repeat offenders.194 The Video
Privacy Protection Act, cited by the Hulu court, awards a minimum of
$2,500 per violation.195 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in Hulu, the
court held the generosity of statutory damages as weighing against the
use of affidavits, thereby preventing the class from being ascertainable and precluding certification.196 In deciding whether the plaintiffs
had satisfied ascertainability, the court found that the large damage
award authorized by the Video Privacy Protection Act made the use of
affidavits inappropriate, holding that “when dollar amounts are
higher, some form of verification is appropriate beyond just an affidavit.”197 The court reasoned that the large damage amount “creates incentives for claimants” to fabricate claims.198 Inasmuch as courts have
not yet determined whether statutory damages under the other statutes are large enough to militate against affidavits, plaintiffs requesting ascertainability by affidavit must exercise caution in pleading or
risk denial of certification.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S OBVIATION OF THE ASCERTAINABILITY
REQUIREMENT DOES NOT SOLVE THE CHALLENGES ASCERTAINABILITY
PRESENTS TO DATA PRIVACY CLASSES
It is important to acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit rendered
moot the problematic cases199 mentioned in this Note in Briseno v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc.200 The Briseno court eliminated the ascertainability requirement in the Ninth Circuit, saying that “an independent administrative feasibility requirement is unnecessary.”201 However, data
privacy class actions are unique inasmuch as they are particularly
widespread and often have victims in every circuit in the United
States. For example, the Target data breach cases involved complaints
in California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c).
194. Id. § 2520(c).
195. Id. § 2710(c)(2).
196. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 2758598, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal.
June 16, 2014).
197. Id. at *15.
198. Id. at *16.
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. 844 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2017).
201. Id.
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Washington.202 Research uncovered class action complaints in the
Gmail case in jurisdictions from New Jersey203 to California.204 The
widespread nature of data privacy suits makes it all but certain that
complaints will be filed in jurisdictions that maintain a separate ascertainability requirement. The Supreme Court’s aversion to certifying
the question of ascertainability makes it likely the circuit split will persist for the time being.205 Even more troubling, plaintiffs may not always be able to certify nationwide classes in the jurisdiction of their
choice. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court, data privacy classes that cannot prove minimum
contacts with California may not be able to avail themselves of the
Ninth Circuit’s favorable ascertainability caselaw.206 Thus, while the
Ninth Circuit no longer permits a heightened ascertainability requirement, there are many circuits that do embrace the requirement, and
the victims of data breaches who live in those jurisdictions may not be
able to escape the negative rulings in their circuits by virtue of a nationwide class.
D. COURTS SHOULD NOT CREATE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES FOR SIMILARLY
SITUATED PLAINTIFFS
The capacity of the ascertainability requirement to inhibit recovery in data privacy suits should raise concern. Damages have long
been accepted as an effective mechanism to incentivize good behavior.207 Though in a perfect world people would behave well out of a
sense of altruism, the world is not perfect—therefore the law is replete with carrots and sticks.208 Indeed, assigning monetary damages
202. See Transfer Order, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No.
13-cv-00793 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 3, 2014) (listing the various actions considered for consolidation across states).
203. See Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Villani v. Google, Inc., No. 12-cv-01740
(D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2012).
204. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 1, 6–7, In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y
Litig., No. 12-cv-01382 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2012).
205. See generally Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016); Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d
654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
206. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1787 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. 4, f. 18, pl. 6 (1401) (expounding the
first articulation of negligence liability in 1401 AD).
208. See generally Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic
Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks To Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 213 (2016) (discussing possible downsides
of the many legal “nudges” meant to encourage actions for the common good).
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to undesirable acts can incentivize good behavior even where economic forces would not.209 Injunctions, while preventing future
abuses, typically do not have the requisite punitive effect to disincentivize bad behavior.210 It is not improper to surmise that tech giants
will likely be incentivized to safeguard data if every breach in a class
encompassing millions carries thousands of dollars in penalties. Given
lawmakers’ technological ineptitude, plaintiff classes are likely one of
the most powerful mechanisms for holding tech companies accountable. Indeed, studies suggest that class action plaintiffs are indeed motivated by a desire to hold societal actors accountable.211
Additionally, the diverging requirements of the circuits regarding
ascertainability create an uneven legal landscape where certain plaintiffs are subjected to more exacting certification requirements than
others.212 A divergence that, as previously discussed, exerts particular
influence on data privacy class actions.213 Despite the widespread
presence of federal circuit splits, the Framers of the Constitution expressed a clear preference for uniform application of federal law.214
Uniform application of the law, however, was not solely the purview
of the founders.215 Indeed, even though the Federal Rules of Civil

209. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERhow legal liability can incentivize externality minimization).
But see Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995) (arguing
that pecuniary penalties actually result in perverse incentives that contravene stated
policy goals).
210. See, e.g., FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: INJUNCTION § 175 (2020) (“[T]he purpose [of the injunction] is not punishment but is rather to eliminate and prevent violations of the antitrust laws.”).
211. See, e.g., Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 90
(2011).
212. Compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that
identification of plaintiffs must take place at the “class certification state”), with Mullins v. Direct Digit., L.L.C., 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015) (arguing that Carrera’s
approach to ascertainability “misreads Rule 23” and that such decisions could wait until “later in the litigation”).
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (citing the existence of the federal judiciary as furthering the “necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws”).
215. See Thucydides, The Funeral Oration of Pericles, in PLUTARCH’S CIMON AND PERICLES 163, 165 (Bernadotte Perrin ed., 1910) (asserting that before the law “all citizens
are on an equality”).
SPS. 11 (1991) (detailing
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Procedure extol the virtues of “speedy” and “inexpensive” resolution
of suits, they also ostensibly aim for a resolution that is “just.”216
At present, rather than ensuring equal protection of the law, ascertainability presents the following conundrum. In cases where perfunctory references to defendant’s records are insufficient to establish
an “administratively feasible” method of ascertaining the class, plaintiffs likely must either forego damages or take their chances requesting certification by affidavit. On one hand, forgoing damages diminishes the incentive of tech companies to safeguard user data.217 On the
other hand, establishing ascertainability by affidavit subjects plaintiffs
to the incoherent judgments of courts as evidenced in Hulu and Harris.218 While those lucky enough to live in circuits without ascertainability avoid this bleak situation, millions of others live in jurisdictions
where ascertainability is a requirement.219 For them, the only recourse would be transferring to a jurisdiction without the heightened
ascertainability requirement, an option that has no guarantee of success and that the Supreme Court could foreclose. All of this is to say
that ascertainability can (and already has) resulted in similarly situated parties receiving different outcomes.220
E. COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACH TO ASCERTAINABILITY UNDERMINES THE
OBJECTIVE OF EFFICIENT ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS AT THE BASE OF RULE 23
Writing in 1967 (a year after the adoption of Rule 23), Benjamin
Kaplan emphasized the principal of efficiency underlying the genesis
of the rule, saying that the objective of the (b)(3) damages class is to
“get at the cases where a class action promises important advantages
of economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution
of procedural safeguards for members of the class or for the opposing
party.”221 These “economies of effort” manifest most powerfully class
actions’ capacity to permit plaintiffs with small claims an incentive to
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
217. Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and the Third-Party Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 128 (arguing that without the ability for plaintiffs to “recover damages,” private companies will not have the incentive to “adopt
stringent procedures”).
218. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
220. Compare Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 588 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding
that use of affidavits was “manageable”), with In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764,
2014 WL 2758598, at *54 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014) (finding ascertainability was not
satisfied despite similarities in claims and class to comScore).
221. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390 (1967).
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bring a suit. The Supreme Court encapsulated this rationale in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, saying that “the policy at the very core
of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”222
Courts’ approach to ascertainability in the context of data privacy, however, undermines this goal. In prohibiting the use of affidavits to satisfy ascertainability, the Hulu court effectively foreclosed
monetary relief for the plaintiff class due to defendants’ bad recordkeeping.223 Though this does not necessarily inflict undue hardship on
plaintiffs (damages are likely to be small anyway),224 it does prevent
the courts from effectively disposing of the class in a way that incentivizes good behavior on the part of defendants. If the only remedy left
for data privacy classes is injunctive relief, society, rather than plaintiffs, will be left poorer, as defendants will have no incentive to behave
in a socially responsible way.225
A useful point of comparison is the jurisprudence surrounding
consumer class actions. Courts’ tolerance of ascertainability by affidavit in consumer class actions promotes efficiency through the use of
compensatory damages.226 There, courts embrace the use of affidavits
as a way to establish ascertainability when defendants’ records are insufficient to identify class members at the certification stage.227 In doing so, the court creates a system where compensatory damages,
though small, aggregate into a large enough penalty to incentivize
good behavior without creating the incentive to falsify claims. In the
data privacy context, though compensatory damages are less easily
calculable,228 nominal damages could serve a similar function, provided Congress amends legislation to permit them.229 If courts substitute the use of nominal damages for compensatory damages, but otherwise mimic consumer class jurisprudence (as this Note suggests
222. 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
223. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., 2014 WL 2758598, at *13–14.
224. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Ball, Damages in Class Actions: Determinations and Allocations, 10 B.C. L. REV. 615, 623 (1969) (“Usually the individual damages [in a class
action] that without the device of a class suit the plaintiff would not be afforded any
relief.”).
225. See supra Part I.B.
226. See infra Part III.B.
227. See, e.g., Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417–18
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (permitting plaintiffs to employ affidavits in establishing ascertainability provided damages are small).
228. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
229. See infra Part III.C.
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they should), they will both incentivize good behavior as well as permit the efficient adjudication of claims, in line with the original policy
goals of Rule 23. This, of course, requires legislative action to mitigate
high statutory damage minimums,230 as well as court cooperation.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY
STATUTES TO PROVIDE DAMAGES IN A NOMINAL AMOUNT, AND
COURTS SHOULD PERMIT ASCERTAINABILITY BY AFFIDAVIT
This Part proposes a two-part solution to the capricious application of ascertainability in data privacy suits. To begin, Congress ought
to amend data privacy legislation to permit lower damages awards.
This would preclude courts from penalizing plaintiffs for large statutory damage provisions in popular data privacy statutes. Additionally,
courts should draw upon existing consumer class action jurisprudence and let plaintiffs satisfy the requirement of ascertainability
through affidavit. As some courts have already noted, such action
would run little practical risk of fraudulent claims while simultaneously creating an aggregate financial impact sufficient to incentivize
responsible behavior.231
A. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND
OTHER DATA PRIVACY STATUTES TO PERMIT NOMINAL DAMAGES
To prevent courts from using large statutory damages awards as
a reason to preclude affidavit use (and therefore, ascertainability),
Congress should enact a statute creating a cause of action for data
breaches and ensure the legislation awards plaintiffs nominal damages. Such a statute would preclude the reasoning employed by the
Hulu court in finding a lack of ascertainability.232 Currently, popular
statutes for data privacy class actions impose strict minimums for
damages in civil suits. For instance, the Stored Communications Act,
while providing a private right of action, imposes a $1,000 required
minimum of damages for each claim.233 The Video Privacy Protection
Act, cited by the Hulu court, awards a minimum of $2,500 per violation.234 Congress should assiduously avoid minimum civil damages
awards approaching these levels. Replicating generous awards might

230. See infra Part III.A.
231. See infra notes 262–68, 272–74 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (requiring that persons recovering under the statute shall
not recover “less than the sum of $1,000”).
234. Id. § 2710(c)(2)(A).
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make the success of suits contingent upon the diligence with which
defendants keep records.235
In so legislating, Congress should also endeavor to avoid the mistakes of recently passed state legislation and emulate more sensible
legislation. New York, for instance, recently enacted the Stop Hacks
and Improve Electronic Data Security (SHIELD) Act.236 New York’s law
broadens existing statutory definitions to prohibit any unauthorized
access to private or personal information.237 While the law correctly
assigns a $20 fee for each documented breach and avoids the obstacles
that plague common-law theories of relief, it also suffers from shortfalls.238 For instance, it caps damages at $250,000,239 a sum unlikely to
encourage good behavior in the wealthiest defendants.240 Further, the
law permits civil suits but only by the state attorney general, thereby
depriving victims of the ability to pursue recourse.241
Conversely, California recently enacted the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA).242 Since its passage, “more than a dozen class action[s]” have been filed in California courts.243 Unlike the New York
legislation, the CCPA gives consumers a private right of action.244
What’s more, the law imposes a maximum civil liability of $750 per
consumer.245 Not only is this award far below the $2,500 that the Hulu
court found to be so objectionable, but the law also sets the minimum
at a mere $100,246 thereby permitting plaintiffs to address the Hulu
court’s concerns and reduce damages.247

235. See, e.g., supra note 64.
236. See Dimitri Sirota, Why U.S. Companies Should Know About the CCPA and New
York SHIELD Act, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2020/09/16/why-us-companies-should-know-about-the-ccpa
-and-new-york-shield-act [https://perma.cc/VAT9-3PYV] (discussing implications of
SHIELD Act).
237. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-AA (Consol. 2020).
238. Id. § 899-AA(6)(a).
239. Id.
240. See Marty Swant, The World’s Most Valuable Brands 2020, FORBES, https://
www.forbes.com/the-worlds-most-valuable-brands [https://perma.cc/YMM6-T4VK]
(valuing the mere brands of Apple at $241.2 billion, Google at $207.5 billion, and Microsoft at $162.9 billion).
241. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-AA(6)(a).
242. See Sirota, supra note 236.
243. See id.
244. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (2020).
245. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
246. Id.
247. See supra note 165.
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However, even if the CCPA proves to be a perfect device for California class actions, it would still be insufficient to afford relief to nationwide classes. Data privacy victims are seldom (if ever) confined
within particular states,248 and remaining avenues of relief are troublingly fraught. Other theories of pleading a cause of action in data privacy class actions include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),
state common-law theories of breach of contract and trespass to chattels, and state computer crime laws.249 However, such alternate theories do not serve the interests of judicial efficiency as effectively as
federal provisions awarding statutory damages. To begin, the CFAA
requires plaintiffs to prove $5,000 in damages before they can plead a
civil cause of action.250 Further, courts have not uniformly determined
whether plaintiffs can aggregate damages under CFAA to meet the
$5,000 threshold.251 Given courts’ tendency to award low damages for
misplacement of data, it is unclear whether plaintiffs could individually clear the $5,000 requirement to successfully plead a private cause
of action.252 As such, CFAA does not present an efficient alternative to
the Stored Communications Act and other laws awarding statutory
damages.
Common-law theories of trespass to chattels have differing viability from state to state, thereby undermining their efficacy in sustaining a nationwide class (which maximizes efficiency and gives
plaintiffs access to federal court).253 Breach of contract theories leave
out plaintiffs who did not have a contract with the defendant, such as
non-Yahoo-using recipients of Yahoo messages in the Yahoo
248. See supra Introduction.
249. Kathleen C. Riley, Note, Data Scraping as a Cause of Action: Limiting Use of the
CFAA and Trespass in Online Copying Cases, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
245, 265 (2018) (detailing various theories of liability for data privacy cases).
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
251. See, e.g., Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 589 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (leaving unresolved the question of whether plaintiff class members can aggregate damages
to meet CFAA’s $5,000 damages requirement).
252. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig.,
45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that, without evidence of data misuse, the harm
resulting from the loss of data was insufficient to confer standing); Reilly v. Ceridian
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that mere loss of data, compared to actual
misuse, was insufficient to confer standing).
253. Compare Matzan v. Eastman Kodak Co., 134 A.D.2d 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(refusing to allow a trespass to chattels theory of damages if the intangible property
was not merged with something tangible), with CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that electronic signals in the
transmission of personal data are sufficiently tangible to support a trespass to chattels
theory of damages).
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litigation.254 As such, a federal law permitting nominal damages would
provide a standard theory of liability that enables nationwide classes
while removing incentives for plaintiffs to fabricate claims—the contingency that so preoccupied the Hulu court.255
Specifically, this Note suggests nominal damages of approximately $100. Apart from the numeric appeal of $100, this amount
closely approximates awards that other courts have found acceptable
when established exclusively by affidavit. In Mullins v. Direct Digital,
L.L.C. the court encountered a prospective class where the plaintiffs
proposed to establish ascertainability exclusively through the use of
affidavits.256 Noting the complete lack of evidence of any fraudulent
claims and the fact that only a tiny proportion of an average class typically submits a claim, the court found that “claims of this magnitude
[are unlikely to] have provoked the widespread submission of inaccurate or fraudulent claims.”257 While some courts will still have to adjust their jurisprudence (indeed, adjusting jurisprudence is part of
this Note’s solution), circuit court caselaw lends support to $100 as an
acceptable medium.258 The rational counterargument that reducing
awards will disincentivize participation is somewhat undermined by
the fact that many class actions give exceedingly low awards,259 and
participation is low to begin with.260
B. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT CONSUMER CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
PERMITTING MORE LIBERAL USE OF AFFIDAVITS TO ESTABLISH
ASCERTAINABILITY
Just as important as permitting statutory damages, courts will
also need to play along and permit satisfaction of the ascertainability
requirement through affidavits when defendant records are
254. In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (including plaintiffs who did not have accounts with Yahoo but had lost data when they emailed Yahoo
accounts).
255. In re Hulu Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 2758598, at *16 (June 17,
2014).
256. 795 F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).
257. Id. at 667.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Open Class Action Lawsuit Settlements You Can Claim!, TOP CLASS ACTIONS, https://topclassactions.com/category/lawsuit-settlements/open-lawsuit
-settlements [https://perma.cc/QJ9N-ZF7A] (listing potential claims of $2.50, $53.33,
$33, $19.99, and $10).
260. See Alison Frankel, FTC’s Comprehensive Study Finds Median Consumer Class
Action Claims Rate Is 9%, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-otc-claimsrate/ftcs-comprehensive-study-finds-median-consumer-class
-action-claims-rate-is-9-idUSKCN1VV2QU [https://perma.cc/E625-GX8B].
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insufficient. Luckily, courts have already created an analogous and
easily applicable body of caselaw regarding consumer classes. In In re
Dial Complete Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, plaintiff sued a
soap manufacturer, but the defendant’s records did not identify every
member of the prospective class.261 The court permitted the plaintiffs
to establish ascertainability by affidavit, reasoning that denying certification due to the defendant’s inept recordkeeping would render
toothless many consumer class actions.262 Similarly, in Lyngaas v.
Curaden AG, the court certified a class even though plaintiffs sought to
establish ascertainability through affidavit.263 In doing so, the court
identified ways the court could mitigate the risk of a false claim, holding that the benefit of protecting class viability outweighed the risk.264
Still more courts—including in the previously mentioned Mullins decision265—have contributed to this jurisprudence, holding that, whatever the risks of fraudulent claims, establishing affidavits are a legitimate way of establishing ascertainability, thereby preserving the
viability of small claims without records.266
Indeed, the concurrence in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc. concisely encapsulates the philosophy of this line of cases. In that case, a couple leased a
laptop from Aaron’s, a purveyor of office supplies.267 When an Aaron’s
employee came to repossess the laptop for alleged lack of payments,
the employee allegedly showed the Byrds a screenshot depicting web
activity on the laptop.268 In finding the class to be ascertainable, the
court dismissed the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs were
trying to establish ascertainability solely through unverified affidavits.269 However, in doing so, the court indicated that unverifiable affidavits were an inappropriate method of establishing ascertainability, implying that to permit such affidavits would violate the

261. In re Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 49 (D.N.H. 2015).
262. Id. at 51 (arguing that preclusion of affidavits would thwart “[t]he policy at
the very core of the class action mechanism,” i.e., “to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights” (citation omitted)).
263. Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1024 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
264. Id. at 1027.
265. Mullins v. Direct Digit., L.L.C., 795 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2015).
266. See, e.g., Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 11-cv-226, 2014 WL 11370455, at
*6 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2014); Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D.
408, 417–18 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
267. 784 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 170.
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defendants’ due process rights.270 In a concurrence, Judge Rendell
pointed out the absurdity of the concern about false affidavits.271 He
wrote that “chances that someone would, under penalty of perjury,
sign a false affidavit . . . for the sake of receiving a [small] windfall . . .
are far-fetched at best.”272 Far-fetched indeed. Just as importantly,
Judge Rendell pointed out the deterrent effect of small claims in large
suits saying that “[o]n the other hand . . . in the aggregate, this sum is
significant enough to deter corporate misconduct” when the class is
large.273 With claims as large as those in data privacy suits, his is a
point well-taken.
C. NEW LEGISLATION AND A MORE PERMISSIVE ATTITUDE BY COURTS
WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUES CURRENTLY AFFLICTING DATA PRIVACY
LITIGATION
Finally, this solution—in addition to being fair—addresses challenges currently confronting data privacy classes. Foremost among
the challenges inherent in ascertainability’s role in data privacy is inconsistent determinations despite similar facts.274 Enacting legislation providing for $100 in nominal damages would empower courts
to permit plaintiffs’ establishment of ascertainability through affidavit
by minimizing judicial fears of perjury. Having removed the enticement of a windfall award, Hulu’s concern for fraudulent claims becomes less credulous and permits a uniform embrace of affidavits.
Such legislation and court cooperation would also address the fact
that Hulu’s focus on the size of awards is uniquely problematic for data
privacy classes, which employ statutes that grant generous awards.275
Further, by enacting national legislation, Congress would ensure that
recourse for data breaches is not contingent upon a plaintiff’s state of
residence or the state of the defendant’s records. Currently courts’ inconsistent application of ascertainability and the fragmented legislative landscape surrounding data privacy prevent the assurance of
equal justice for similarly situated plaintiffs,276 an ill that would be
remedied with a national cause of action. Finally, nationwide legislation and court cooperation would further Rule 23’s objectives, efficient disposition of otherwise economically unviable claims. As the
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id. at 172–77 (Rendell, J., concurring).
Id. at 175.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.D.
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discussion of standing indicated, courts rarely characterize injuries
from data breaches in large, concrete terms.277 The uncertainty, or
small size, of individual awards ensures that the vast majority of
claims would not be sustainable on an individual basis.278 As a result,
without the incentives provided by the prospect of substantial damages, defendants have very little incentive to behave responsibly.279
Providing an acceptably low statutory award of damages, and the cooperation of courts, would obviate the glaring deficiencies in the current system.
CONCLUSION
Data breaches are not going anywhere.280 As such, data privacy
class actions likely are not going anywhere either. As long as the Supreme Court refuses to settle the ascertainability circuit split, district
and circuit courts’ unsupervised and inconsistent approaches to ascertainability will also persist. This conundrum puts data privacy litigants in an awkward position. If defendants’ records do not conclusively establish class membership, plaintiffs face an uncomfortable
catch-22. To avoid the issue of ascertainability, plaintiffs must limit
themselves to an injunctive class.281 If plaintiffs seek damages (with
all their deterrent and compensatory advantages) and defendant’s
records are insufficient to identify every class member, plaintiffs risk
denial of certification based on ascertainability.282 What is more, if
they seek to correct gaps in defendants’ records with affidavits, they
risk the possibility of courts holding a facet of their best theories for
relief (the generous statutory damages in federal statutes) against
them.283 Even if courts do not perseverate on the issue of large damage
awards, plaintiffs still have to navigate courts’ conflicting views on
“manageability.”284 The existing situation provides neither clarity nor
relief, and it fails to incentivize good behavior.
However, if Congress amends statutes like the Stored Communications Act to provide for nominal damages and courts cooperate, the
situation might improve. To begin, pleading nominal claims in large
277. See supra Part I.D.
278. See supra Part II.E.
279. See supra Part II.D.
280. See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 596–97 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that (b)(2) injunctive classes did not have an ascertainability requirement).
282. See supra Part III.B.
283. See supra Part II.B.
284. See supra Part II.A.
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quantities—many data privacy classes include vast numbers of members—would likely impose a deterrent effect on data privacy defendants. As for compensation, though plaintiffs would certainly not receive the windfall the Stored Communications Act and other statutes
currently provide,285 nominal damages are better than nothing. Finally, if courts cooperate and accept affidavits as a matter of course
under laws like the Stored Communications Act, parties will achieve a
modicum of predictability they currently lack. In doing so, the legislature and courts will minimize the ascertainability circuit split’s capacity to inflict inequitable outcomes.

285. See, e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (awarding at least
$1,000 per claim).

